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Rocking on its Hinges? The League of Nations, the United Nations and the New History of 
Internationalism in the Twentieth Century. 
Simon Jackson, University of Birmingham 
Alanna O’Malley, Leiden University 
 
When the last remaining servants of the League of Nations (LON), led by Sean Lester, its final 
Secretary General, arrived at the San Francisco conference in the summer of 1945, belatedly 
invited by the United States government, they were “given no role and only seats in the last row 
of the gallery”. Amidst “much evocation of new orders and new worlds”, the main players at the 
conference scrupulously made “as little mention as possible of the organisation that had gone 
before”.1 This act of diplomatic theatre symbolized a wider rupture with the past, ensuring that 
the nascent United Nations (UN) would not be tarnished by association with its purportedly 
“failed” predecessor. San Francisco, gleaming on the Pacific, was separated by a wide continent 
and another ocean from war-ravaged Europe, and particularly from the LON’s cavernous, empty 
headquarters in Geneva: the founding of the UN was meant to be a hinge, pivoting the world into 
a new era full of promise.
2
  
In certain respects, it was - and it did. Differences between the League and the UN were 
pronounced from the outset. The UN, and especially its General Assembly, was fundamentally 
more representative of peoples and nations than had been the “League of Empires,” to employ 
Susan Pedersen’s apt term; and it grew far more so as decolonization, in complex partnership 
with the Cold War, swelled the ranks of the member states.
3
 The UN also lacked certain powers 
that the League had enjoyed, most noticeably as a result of the introduction of the veto-system in 
the Security Council. But despite these major changes the UN also quietly assimilated – often in 
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ways artfully hidden from the global public’s view - many of the LON’s organisations and 
experts. It built on their work in a range of “technical” (though still eminently political) areas, 
from healthcare to social and economic development policies, through institutions such as the 
reformed World Health Organization and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).
4
 
Historians have long chronicled the UN’s rise from the ashes of World War II, yielding a 
spectrum of conclusions from the laudatory and teleological to the critical and disaggregating.
5
 
Across that spectrum, however, many of them have shared a view of the League as a salutary 
failure, the indispensable political counterpoint and analytical premise of the UN’s rise. This 
failure is habitually sketched in a brisk opening panorama peopled with Klemens Von 
Metternich, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Woodrow Wilson, Aristide Briand and Adolf Hitler, before 
the author turns to a portrait of the post-1945 dawn.
6
 Karl Polanyi wrote, for example, that “In 
vain did Geneva look toward the restoration of such a balance of power system in an enlarged 
and improved Concert of Europe called the League of Nations; in vain were facilities for 
consultation and joint action provided in the Covenant of the League, for the essential 
precondition of independent power units was now lacking”.7 Only in the last decade have 
historians gone back to the LON, asking not why it failed — and by implication why the UN 
“succeeded,” or might yet succeed — but how the League worked, and what legacies its 
machinery, its personnel, and its global audience inspired.
8
 This book’s contributors advance 
through the breaches in older historiography engineered by those scholars and our debt to them is 
manifest. But by pooling expertise on a variety of themes, periods and geographies we can offer 
a view of the League and the UN from a far wider variety of standpoints and across a broader 
chronology than any single historian might hope to. The overall effect is not merely to 
supplement the new international history of the League and the UN with a bestiary of additional 
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case studies, but to globalise it methodologically, offering what Susan Pedersen in her foreword 
to this volume calls a “multi-local” grasp of liberal internationalism at work around the world. 
  
We deliver this across the approximate period from the 1920s to the 1970s, the long moment of 
the rise of the nation-state as a dominant political form worldwide, while also dropping 
periodically back into the late nineteenth century in order to appraise the legacies of the “first age 
of globalization” and note the influence of the burgeoning, self-consciously “new 
internationalism” characteristic of that era.9 Ranging primarily, then, from the “Wilsonian 
Moment” after World War I to the conjuncture of the Helsinki Accords and the twin rise of 
human rights and neo-liberalism in the 1970s, the book nuances and contextualises the hallowed 
rupture of “Year Zero,” 1945, rather than dwelling exclusively on and singularising that 
moment.
10
 As a whole the essays thereby provide both a panorama of the two institutions across 
the twentieth century and a core focus on the continuities and disjunctures between the League 
and UN. At the level of the institutions themselves, one result is to respond to Andrew Webster’s 
inviting comment on a key recent monograph on the League that “it would have been intriguing 
to track at greater length some of the currents running from [the] League to United Nations. The 
precedents, procedures, and indeed very people involved with the governance of mandates did 
not disappear with the end of the League itself. On the contrary they explicitly informed what 
came next”.11  
More widely, the result of the book’s chronology is a significant nuancing of the naturalized 
binaries historians have piled onto that broad-shouldered year, 1945: empire versus the nation-
state, (anti)-Fascism versus the Cold War, racial-civilizational hierarchy versus developmental-
economic hierarchy, and group-based rights claims versus individual rights claims.
12
 In this way 
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we contribute to a wider debate on the periodization of the twentieth century stimulated by the 
growth of global histories of empire as a political formation, which often end in 1945.
13
 We also 
challenge other chronological patterns, such as Charles S. Maier’s influential analysis of the two 
post war moments of 1918 and 1945 in terms of embedded liberalism; a paradigm still 
entrenched in international history and international relations (IR).
14
  
Indeed, in the neighbouring discipline of IR we hope more generally to refigure the ways in 
which constructivist, post-structuralist, critical and historically minded IR scholars conceive of 
international institutions, by providing a bridge to the new international history, one supported 
by a solid span of case studies. We hope thereby to foster a more sustained and mutually 
beneficial exchange between the fields. IR scholars of varied theoretical allegiance, from Robert 
Cox and Martha Finnemore to John Ikenberry and Thomas Weiss, have long analysed the ways 
in which institutions contribute to the construction of international norms and global orders, 
while debate on the nature of international organisations has regularly divided such noted 
structural realists as John J. Mearsheimer from such broadly liberal internationalists as Anne-
Marie Slaughter.
15
 Exponents of more global approaches to IR, meanwhile, have increasingly 
deployed historical approaches to focus on bloc politics, smaller states and civil society actors, 
and, as in the case of Amitav Acharya for example, have emphasized the importance of non-
Western theories and regional specificities.
16
 The essays below will nourish such approaches, 
helping to reframe and more thoroughly historicize views of the LON and the UN and the ways 
they shaped the international order. For instance, they bring into focus not just how institutions 
changed as bureaucracies but also how international practices relating to the end of empire, 
nation-building in the postcolonial world and the creation of rights regimes evolved. As part of 
this process, many of the chapters tease out specific visions of how institutions worked 
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simultaneously as negotiated platforms, forums for debate and in some cases, agents themselves. 
Nathan Kurz’s incisive study of petitioning of the League and UN, for example, offers a new 
interpretation of the international legal system at mid-century by positioning the LON and UN 
athwart locally specific yet internationally resonant strands of political reason. 
We thereby challenge IR scholars to far more granular historicizing of how institutions work and 
how they effected and continue to effect change in both state policies and broader cultures of the 
“international.” Instead of playing off the varying schools of thought against each other, we 
encourage critical and positivist IR theorists alike to deliberate more historically and in more 
fully achieved context on the dynamic role that these organisations have played in relation to 
broader internationalisms across time. It is argued in many of the chapters below that 
internationalism was far more than the product of what global institutions like the UN or LON 
did centrally in New York and Geneva, or how they funnelled or shaped the sovereign power of 
empires and nation-states. Rather, internationalism in this volume includes regional cooperation, 
non-state activism, the rise of international civil society and the global dialogue between local, 
subaltern protagonists and the international visions of the elites. As the case studies show, all this 
sustained an array of different types and forms of internationalism, and thus offers plentiful 
resources to IR scholars who have long moved past static categories of analysis such as 
“development” and “modernity.” In undercutting the telos of such logics, the book furnishes, to 
take George Lawson’s terms, different “context[s] and narrative[s]” of internationalism, but it 
also sharpens and refreshes modes of enquiry based on the social scientific staples of 
“eventfulness and ideal-typification”.17 
 
Across the watershed of 1945, then, the essays examine the evolution of internationalist ideas, 
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institutions and practices at — and between — the League and UN. The essays make their 
arguments through empirical research on fields of internationalist activity from political strategy 
to economic development, from international law to practices of rights, and from 
humanitarianism to the changing forms of empire. Changes in internationalist thought and 
technocracy are thereby appraised in contexts such as the re-constitution of political identity in 
the Middle East or the imperial use of forced labour. Overall, we show how the LON and UN 
both shaped and were shaped by global internationalisms, in the rich variety of its protagonists 
— liberals, socialists, Fascists and Communists all engaged with the League and UN through 
national representation and through intersecting international organisations, we should note — 
and the grinding tectonics of its norms.
18
 
Crucially, the book takes this approach not just from the habitual “centres” of League and UN 
politics, the fetishized lieux de mémoire of Geneva, New York or Bretton Woods, where the 
clacking of secretariat typewriters echoed against the carved wheat sheaves of prosperity 
foretold, but from a global, multi-local perspective.
19
 We do not neglect the importance of the 
politicians and diplomats who strode the stage in the Palais des Nations in Geneva or at the UN 
Headquarters in Manhattan, or ignore the administrative and technocratic bureaucracies that 
operated the scenery and drafted the scripts.
20
 But our central argument is that although the LON 
and UN shaped internationalism from the centre, as political proscenia, technocratic clearing 
houses and vehicles for world ordering, they were just as powerfully moulded by 
internationalisms that welled up globally, far beyond the main stages of Geneva and New York 
City.
21
 As such, the history of internationalism at and between the League and UN must be 
grasped as much in Japan and Argentina, for example, as in Geneva and Manhattan. Indeed, as 
historians including Meredith Terretta and José Antonio Sánchez Román argue, the prisons of 
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West Africa or the banks of the Amazon and Tigris were places just as “international,” and quite 
as constitutive of “internationalism,” as the smoke-filled committee rooms and champagne-oiled 
assemblies overlooking Lac Leman or the East River.
22
  
To give an example, Nova Robinson’s essay in this book, on international women’s rights from 
1920-1953, opens at a typical League event – a pre-Assembly reception in Geneva that included 
a keynote by Maria Vérone, a leading French advocate of women’s rights, and that likely also 
featured the popping of champagne corks, the massed “artillery of the League of Nations”.23 But 
crucially, Robinson also weaves into her account the campaigns of the General Oriental Feminist 
Alliance, a regional Arab women’s organisation based in Syria, and appraises the January 1931 
gathering, in Lahore, of the All Asian Women’s Conference. By bringing the delegates at Lahore 
into analytical conversation with the delegates who saw Vérone at her Swiss podium, Robinson 
shows how the internationalist “spirit of Geneva” was partly made in the Punjab. In doing so she 
also warns international historians against reproducing, in the balance of their research, those 
hierarchies and exclusions that structured the cast and made the stars of the cacophonous, long-
running performances in Geneva and New York City.
24
 Likewise, Konrad Lawson’s study of the 
visions for world federalism conjured in the ruins of defeat by Japanese politician-writers Ozaki 
Yukio and Kagawa Toyohiko shows how the global re-ordering that took place after 1945 must 
be grasped not just at San Francisco or Bretton Woods. Instead, Lawson shows how the 
discussions and disappointments of San Francisco, for example, reverberated in East Asia, and 
catalysed the transformation of older social and geopolitical ideas for use in Japanese post-war 
society.  
As noted above and as the geographical and archival diversity of these examples suggests, the 
strength of a collective volume lies in its ability to “allow various specialists to enter into a 
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broader dialogue while addressing specific, common themes”.25 Methodologically, meanwhile, 
the wider scope of a collective analysis allows for a blend of the insights of de-centred 
ethnography, lately exemplified by Lori Allen’s recent work on human rights practices in 
Palestine, with wide-angled views on the spatially expansive institutional cultures of 
internationalism, as in the work of Anne-Isabelle Richard, Helen McCarthy and Glenda Sluga on 
the associational infrastructure of the League, and finally with political studies of the dynamics 
in play on the central stages of Geneva and Manhattan.
26
  
Accordingly, the essays that follow together construct a multi-scalar, dialogical, and fine-grained 
historical analysis of the role of international organisations as they shaped and were shaped by 
internationalism across the twentieth century. They present an exceptionally wide — though not 
comprehensive — ensemble of actors, stretching across class hierarchies and racialized 
geographies, and they show how the interactions of those actors tested the limits of the League 
and UN as international institutions, and developed internationalism as a variegated, global 
practice. 
For international historians and students of international relations the consequences of this 
argument are significant, since they mandate a critical re-engagement with area studies, global 
history and social history, and with a variety of sources far beyond the holdings of the 
international organisations themselves. For if the appeal of the League and UN archives has 
consisted in their apparent convocation of the world’s opinions and petitions under one roof, and 
perhaps in their translation of that polyglot clamour into English and French, the idea that the 
overlapping internationalism of the two international organisations welled up at the margins 
quite as much as it was made at the centre challenges the epistemological hegemony of those 
documents.
27
 As Terretta has aptly noted of the new wave of human rights histories — in a 
 9 
manner applicable to the wider historiography on internationalism and international institutions 
— they have generally excluded “the narrative accounts of grassroots activists in favour of 
official state documents, UN resolutions, or the letters, speeches, and writings of elected office-
holders, UN representatives, and colonial administrators … But how far can we go … without 
contextualizing the particular settings in which human rights discourses were invoked?”28 In the 
case of international organisations such as the League and the UN, meeting this challenge will 
require international historians to travel further, learn more languages, and above all to 
collaborate more systematically in order to capture the meanings and practices of 
internationalism at the LON and the UN.
29
 This volume takes a step in that direction. 
 
Efforts to institutionalize the management of the world order have a history as old as the exercise 
of imperial power. Moreover, the narrower process of institutionalization has frequently been 
accompanied by the attempts of legislators, national states and varyingly mediated global publics 
to systematize and contest the wider objectives and meaning of internationalism as a social and 
cultural force field.
30
 From the Magna Carta to the Diet of Worms, and from the Hague 
Conventions on International Law of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to the geopolitical 
clearing houses built at the Congresses of Vienna and Berlin, collective strategies to create and 
govern a system of international relations, and to develop legally binding agreements in order to 
realize a specific vision of world order, have underpinned a variety of systems of what we now 
refer to as global governance.
31
 In the litany of institutions that have shaped international 
relations and their interpenetrated norms and cultures, however, the League and the UN are 
distinguished, as Glenda Sluga has lately noted, by their emergence within global wars of 
unprecedented scale and destructiveness.
32
 The League slowly took shape in the years around 
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1920, following the defeat of the Central Powers in World War I, while the United Nations came 
into being, as we saw above, during the post-World War II moment around 1945, an extension of 
the alliance that had defeated the Axis Powers. But while both institutions were forged during 
wartime, each developed its own visions for how to manage peacetime relations, facilitate social 
progress and resolve international security dilemmas, due in part to the wider context and deeper 
roots of their respective eras. Nathan Kurz’s essay in this volume, for example, on Jewish NGOs 
in the late 1940s, shows how numerous protagonists at the UN, many of whom had worked for 
or in contact with the League, set out to create, interpret, and disseminate various narratives of its 
operation in the 1930s so as to justify specific policies after 1945. We must therefore 
acknowledge both institutions as distinct regimes of global governance, specific centres of their 
respective internationalist force fields, the character of which is legitimately open to historical 
interpretation in isolation. But as Kurz’s work neatly illustrates, we must also see the LON and 
UN as a single, interpenetrated, and temporally layered whole, whose empirical global history is 
indispensable to that work of exegesis, and is only now being written.
33
 
 
Based on the famous “Fourteen Points” outlined in January 1918 by the American President 
Woodrow Wilson, the League of Nations came into being as an instrument with which to 
manage international security crises, and crucially, to keep the power of Germany and other 
aggressor states in check following World War I. Wilson presented his “Fourteen Points” as a 
series of edicts about how the imperial world system would be reformed, and how relations 
between states would henceforth be managed; its often vague premises were elaborated, 
mitigated and reworked at the Paris Peace Conferences in 1919. The Covenant of the League was 
its governing charter and statement of purpose, and was drawn up by Wilson and his advisors in 
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contentious collaboration with the victorious allied powers, dominated by Great Britain and 
France. It was an effort to realize many of the Wilsonian principles, setting out policies supposed 
to prevent another world war. The Covenant therefore proposed a series of security measures, 
including disarmament and the use of arbitration to settle international disputes.
34
 It also 
contained a list of treaties on a variety of related technical and social issues, from drug and 
human trafficking to global health initiatives and labour conditions, and two geopolitical 
management systems that acted to “adjudicate relations of sovereignty”: protection of minorities, 
mainly in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and administration of former subjects of the Central 
Powers in the Mandated territories, scattered through the Middle East, Africa and the Pacific.
35
  
The LON’s birth in the mirrored delivery room of Versailles meant that it was dominated by the 
victors: of its fifty or so member states, Germany joined only in 1926 and left again seven years 
later, the USA never joined at all, and the Soviet Union joined only in 1934. Despite this, the 
League was never simply a tool of Britain and France. Having survived its formal abandonment 
by the USA (informal American involvement continued, notably on trade), it became an 
ungovernable theatre for international publicity and norm-making in the 1920s. Increasingly, 
especially in the 1930s, it also became a factory of influential technocratic knowledge 
production, as in the case of the economic and financial activities lately documented by Patricia 
Clavin and Jamie Martin.
36
 Overall, as Susan Pedersen has convincingly argued, what was most 
important about the League was its role as a public platform, managed by an international 
bureaucracy of technicians and experts, on which individuals, other international organisations, 
and nations-in-the-making or possessed of qualified sovereignty, could air their views and 
petitions, and find an audience.  
Turning to the UN, as preparations began in earnest for a new international organisation even 
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before World War II concluded, policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic were keen — as 
noted above — to avoid any association with the tarnished image of the LON. The United 
Nations was received in San Francisco with fanfare from the war-weary international public, and 
was greeted especially enthusiastically in the Global South, where it appeared initially as a 
crowbar to break down the imperial system. From its inception therefore, the new organisation 
did not just protect the interests of the Western powers (though those powers worked hard in that 
direction), but again became an important platform and a mechanism through which the 
international visions of other actors were amplified and heard. Advocates for decolonization, 
civil rights activists and a range of other groups objecting to imperial practices tried to make use 
of the UN platform. One such example was the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP), led by American sociologist and activist W.E.B Du Bois, who seized 
upon the organisation as a means by which to pursue his agenda for civil rights.
37
 The San 
Francisco planners’ announcement of a new era of universal ideals was music to the ears of the 
beleaguered societies still living under imperial or mandated rule, to the nationalist aspirations of 
their future leaders under the colonial yoke, but also to the nascent international anti-colonial 
movement that would radically impact the UN in the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, the 
more truly representative structure of the new organisation was lauded as a platform for 
discourses about rights, the universalizing of human rights and the deconstruction of the racialist, 
imperialist liberal international order. 
As the organisation developed through the 1950s and 1960s it was particularly shaped by the 
visions and ambitions of anti-colonial actors who sought to implement and realize the principles 
enshrined in the Charter by creating, through the UN, mechanisms, tools and policies designed to 
end colonial empire and imperialism through formal means. The successes of the decolonization 
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process can thus be partly attributed to the role of newly-independent states lobbying in the 
chambers of the Security Council and the General Assembly for a shift in norms of imperial 
politics, and to their invigoration of the unrealised potential of the Charter.
38
 During these same 
years, the visionary Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld adopted an interventionist approach 
to international politics, empowering his office with the support of the anti-colonial lobby and 
driving the anti-colonial agenda forward.
39
 In the process, he helped to activate the agency of the 
UN, positioning it as a peacekeeping organisation, a neutral arbiter between states and as a 
monitor of peace settlements - from the Suez Canal in 1956 to the Partial Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty in 1963.  
Building on these achievements, through the 1970s and the 1980s the UN developed as much 
more than a “Parliament of Man” paralyzed by the hard realities of Cold War politics. From 
asserting the rights of states to control their natural resources, to efforts to reshape the 
international economic order, through to the development of a myriad of human rights and the 
expansion of forms and expressions of developmental practice through the 1970s and the 1980s, 
internationalism became increasingly various and visible.
40
 The end of the Cold War and the 
resurgence of interest in the UN as a means of managing international conflicts led to the 
humanitarian interventions of the 1990s in Bosnia, Rwanda and Kosovo. Out of these 
experiences, both positive and negative, emerged the doctrine of “Responsibility to Protect,” 
which, though increasingly questioned, continues to define how the international community 
approaches questions of intervention, protection of citizens and conflict resolution. The UN 
remains at the centre of a wide array of debates on how to manage international relations, 
development, humanitarianism, social and economic equality, environmental problems and 
international security dilemmas.  
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In sum, both the League and the United Nations operated not as unified actors, but rather as 
“platforms” for both formalizing and splintering political ideas and international norms, and as 
laboratories and toolkits of legal and technical procedures. Those procedures were used to 
generate new types of dissidence locally, with which to then return to the fray on the “platforms” 
of Geneva and New York.
41
  
 
How, then, did the League and the UN effect change - and in relation to which forms of global 
internationalism - during the shift from a world of empires to one of nation-states? Although the 
chapters that follow inter-connect in a rich variety of ways, we have placed them into three broad 
thematic sections, the first focused on the production of norms, the second on the development of 
expertise and the third on the global re-ordering of empire through the League and UN. In each 
section the emphasis on the differences and inter-connections between the League and the UN, 
and on a multi-local and global perspective, remain constant. 
In the opening section, both institutions are viewed as arenas in which new international norms 
were produced through the connection of global, multi-local networks with the increasingly 
representative national memberships of the League and UN. Building on Susan Pedersen’s 
sustained focus on the League as a generator of new international norms, three chapters trace the 
patterns of local interaction with the League and UN that shaped norm construction in the crucial 
realms of human rights and national economic and political sovereignty. Both institutions, the 
chapters show, served to collate and broker norms, gradually codifying these shifts into 
recognized but non-binding international norms, or in some cases into international law. 
Nevertheless, as Aurélie Élisa Gfeller has lately emphasised, even norms produced within 
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hierarchical and Eurocentric international organisations are marked by “specific, locally rooted 
dynamics” and by the efforts of a globally diverse set of “norm entrepreneurs”.42 
Illustrating this interplay of global, multi-local dynamics and the collating work of the League 
and UN, Andrew Arsan contextualizes the role of the Lebanese diplomat and scholar Charles 
Malik in shaping human rights norms. Malik is seen in numerous accounts as a figure of the UN 
“centre” par excellence, carved out alongside the likes of René Cassin as a founding father of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.
43
 While acknowledging Malik’s central role in 
the committees of the early UN, Arsan shows how his allegiance to Heideggerian thought and his 
long steeping in the traditions of Lebanese national particularism means we must see neither 
Malik, nor the norms of human rights he helped elaborate, as examples of “conventional” post-
1945 internationalism, even to the degree postulated in the revisionist accounts, such as Samuel 
Moyn’s, that have lately downplayed the salience of human rights in the 1940s.44 Instead, Arsan 
argues we must recognize the irreconcilably tangled multiplicity and specificity that informed 
Malik’s critique of the sovereign nation state as the basis of internationalism. In doing so we may 
better come to terms with the powerful Middle Eastern and League-era influences on the 
elaboration of the universalist UN human rights regime.  
José Antonio Sánchez Román, meanwhile, focusing on norms of economic sovereignty, outlines 
the emergence, well before the fabled era of the Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC) in the 1940s, of a “new, unevenly and intermittently unified global 
periphery”, including Brazil, Romania and Iran, in the LON’s technical economic meetings of 
the 1920s.
45
 By focusing on the politics of fluvial trade, shipping, and the international taxation 
of imperial big business in the 1920s, Román shows that while norms of economic sovereignty 
crystallised at League meetings in Geneva, Brussels and Barcelona, they did so in part through 
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the creation of new connections between, for example, Brazil, Iran and British Mandate Iraq on 
river navigation, or between Argentina and South Africa on monetary policy.
46
 Drawing on 
several Argentinian and Brazilian archives, and marrying business history with global 
intellectual history to remarkable effect, Román also shows how Latin American jurists, such as 
the Venezuelan Federico Álvarez Feo, fought against the recycling at the League of nineteenth 
century imperial legal practices of extraterritoriality, and against influential business lobbies’ use 
of a “free trade” economic vulgate to camouflage their monopoly power. As Feo proclaimed, 
arguing that the League committee for double taxation should investigate foreign utility 
companies gouging citizens of Latin American states: “the law of supply and demand does not 
work in many South American countries.” Feo’s assertion, Román demonstrates, was an early 
instance of the wider and longer-term Latin American attempt to refuse the concept of 
“backwardness” between roughly 1920 and 1980, and to work through the League and UN to 
reshape economic sovereignty accordingly.  
 
The illumination provided by a “de-centred” Latin American perspective on the international 
order recurs in Mats Ingulstad’s and Lucas Lixinski’s chapter on Pan-Americanism at the League 
and UN. They show how the international politics of empire and decolonization, as they emerged 
in Geneva and subsequently in New York, were powerfully affected not just by the European 
empires’ self-preservation instincts, as influentially described by Mark Mazower, but by norms 
of regional and hemispheric internationalism with roots in the Latin-American nineteenth 
century. Latin-American states’ experience with the Monroe Doctrine, which underpinned the 
hegemony of the United States in the Western Hemisphere, informed their approach to both the 
LON Covenant and the UN Charter. Article 51 and Chapter VIII (on regional arrangements) of 
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the latter were particularly influenced by Latin American perspectives.
47
 As Jesús-María Yepes, 
a Colombian jurist and successively a delegate to the LON Assembly, the wartime Pan-American 
conferences and the 1945 San Francisco conference put it: “the Republics of the New World, 
whose spirit of international collaboration is well known, did not want to abandon a regional 
system that was well organized and had proved its mettle, in favour of another, universalist 
system whose efficiency had not yet been proven ... the Charter of the United Nations therefore 
implies no derogation to the Pan-American system”.48 Consequently, on issues such as dispute 
arbitration and non-intervention, Latin Americans toggled ceaselessly, generally by means of 
international law and lawyers, between the successive regional and global scales of 
internationalism on offer, in the pursuit of a more resilient and complete mode of national 
sovereignty.  
By tracing the evolution of these norms of human rights, economic and national sovereignty as 
they welled up in the Middle East and Latin America as much as in Geneva and New York, the 
first section characterizes the League and the UN as networked political forges, where 
international norms were catalysed, collated and legitimized.  
 
As Martha Finnemore has suggested, norms can be characterised by their recognition as such by 
a community of actors, and by their ability to make claims of varying force on the behaviour of 
those actors.
49
 As such, norms at the League and UN became entrenched and increasingly able to 
circulate in part through their performance by specific actors, who in doing so not only defined 
fields and problems and produced medical or jurisprudential knowledge, for instance, but who 
often sought their own consecration as experts.
50
 But such consecration always relied on the 
intersecting and institutionalised operation of other dynamics, notably those of race, class and 
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gender: many claimed expertise, in other words, but the claims of white, male Europeans were 
often facilitated and privileged.
51
 In the second section, therefore, three chapters dealing with 
individual petitioning, humanitarian relief and women’s rights show how experts of varying sorts 
and varying success emerged in circulation between the central secretariats of the League and the 
UN, an evolving constellation of sub-agencies and an orbiting set of philanthropic foundations, 
non-governmental associations and grass-roots activists. Here too, the simultaneously distinct 
and interlinked character of the League and the UN comes to the fore, and the importance of 
global, multi-local nodes of claims to expertise remains constant.   
 
Nathan Kurz’s chapter on individual petitioning at the League and UN shows how the legal 
vocabulary of petitioning the two institutions, and the procedures devised as part of the 
respective processes, made it possible for individuals to test the legitimacy of the international 
order and seek to shape it through their development of grassroots international legal expertise. 
Shifting between the interwar politics of the 1933 Bernheim Petition to the LON, made in 
defence of Central European minority rights threatened by Nazism, and the later activities of 
Jewish NGOs lobbying the UN in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Kurz dissects the complex 
interrelationship between the two institutions.
52
 Drawing on innovative sources including 
television talk shows, and concentrating on the practical and social legal politics of rights rather 
than simply on the intellectual politics of abstract categories in the thought of major theorists, he 
shows how petitioning allowed local experience to be crafted into international expertise, and 
how post-1945 Jewish activists retrospectively reconstructed the Bernheim Petition in the service 
of their goal to universalize minority rights.  
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Florian Hannig’s chapter examines another sphere of expertise at the other end of our 
chronological range, as he shows how the UN’s permanent and expansive role in the system of 
humanitarian aid expertise had its origins in UN planners’ interpretation of the LON’s record, 
but fully crystallized only in the 1970s. Moving the history of international humanitarianism 
away from the UN centre in New York, Hannig positions the East Pakistan/Bangladesh crisis of 
1971 as the moment at which the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 
definitively came to the fore, coordinating some ten million refugees through a hugely expanded 
budget and also contributing to the establishment of the United Nations Disaster Relief Fund and 
the development of the World Food Programme (WFP). Hannig identifies three broad phases 
that led to this moment. First came the years from 1943-1951, when deliberately temporary UN 
expedients, responding to the LON’s perceived track record, sought to alleviate post-World War 
II suffering, largely in Europe. Second was the period 1949-1970, the era of the high Cold War 
and of national sovereignty-focused decolonization, when ad-hoc agencies with a limited 
mandate responded to specific crises such as the Agadir earthquake of 1960 in Morocco, or the 
displacement occasioned by the close of the Algerian War of Independence in 1962, while the 
permanent UN agencies concentrated on economic development. Finally, Hannig analyses the 
period since 1971, as the UN created a durable, global humanitarian relief regime. His chapter 
illuminates how the 1930s and 1970s were both decades of growing expert technocracy at the 
LON and the UN respectively, and how both decades saw waves of new geopolitical 
multipolarity that pushed states, including the USA, to re-envisage their relationship with 
international organisations. Against this backdrop Hannig emphasizes how in the post-Biafra 
climate of public opinion, and thanks to contingencies including Pakistan’s exclusion of the 
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International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the UNHCR stepped into the breach in 1971, 
part of the wider rise of human rights politics in that decade.
53
 
Finally, Nova Robinson’s chapter on the Liaison Committee of International Women’s 
Organizations (LCIWO) and the Origins of an International Women’s Convention similarly 
explores the role of the League and the UN in the contentious, multi-local development of 
expertise, this time in the service of women’s rights, and again shows how the two institutions 
also helped to re-produce raced, classed and gendered exclusions - even within campaigns for 
legal equality. As a representative to the LON and UN for a long list of national women’s rights 
organisations, the LCIWO created a repertoire of publicity tactics and juridical arguments in 
seeking to make the international sphere deliver formal legal equality for women around the 
world, as the culmination of decades of struggle. Based on expert studies, and yet pushing to 
expand and challenge the often male-dominated definition of legitimate expertise, LCIWO 
activists felt an international treaty could then be used to pressure recalcitrant national 
governments to enforce rules on equality between the sexes in a range of areas. But the largely 
North Atlantic and middle class membership of the LCIWO – the same women who have 
generally been the subject of scholarship on this question to date - substantially excluded the 
concerns and demands of women in the colonial world.
54
 Far from accepting this 
marginalization, women in the colonial world organized and fought to make their own claims 
heard, to force the acknowledgement of their own knowledge as expert, and to place their own 
representatives, such as the Ottoman and then Lebanese women’s activist Nour Hamada (1897-
1963), at the heart of the debate. As Robinson shows in her trail-blazing work, the women of the 
colonized world must be brought fully into this history, not least because the hierarchy of 
legitimate expertise established at their expense at the League would strongly influence precisely 
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who participated in the post-1945 international debate on women’s rights at the UN, right 
through to the 1970s.   
Overall, this section shows how the members of the central secretariats and adjunct agencies of 
the League and the UN, in dialogue with a wide range of non-governmental groups and social 
movements welling up around the world, helped to bring key issues to the attention of 
international society. But more than that, it shows how numerous internationalist actors worked 
to make the LON and UN sites for the production of knowledge and claiming of expertise that 
would bring about change. 
 
If the slow transition from the world of empires that ushered in the League to the world of 
nation-states that the UN helped to constitute is a central context for the first two sections’ 
discussions of norms and expertise, in its final section the book takes a wide-angled and more 
direct view of how the League and the UN acted as crucibles for the political transformation of 
imperial formations in the Middle East, East Asia and Africa. Chapters in this section reveal the 
different visions of North-South and East-West relations mediated by the League and UN, and 
highlight the ways in which the two international institutions sponsored the emergence of anti-
colonial nationalism even as they recycled the dynamics and transmitted the legacies of imperial 
rule.
55
 These chapters’ primary deployment of local and imperial frames of analysis serves to 
identify crucial wider contexts in which the League and the UN exercised their influence and in 
which they were also shaped by a wide spectrum of interpretations of liberal internationalism 
that bubbled up in Lisbon, Tokyo, Ankara or Damascus.  
Sarah Shields’ study of “consociational politics” accordingly starts from two local cases: the 
Sanjak (district) of Alexandretta/Iskenderun, in the north of French Mandate Syria, and the 
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earlier case of the city of Mosul, in British Mandate Iraq. Through a close analysis of the way the 
League mediated the Turkish-French dispute over Alexandretta (or Hatay) in 1936 and the 
Turkish-British conflict over Mosul in 1925, Shields shows how the Wilsonian logic of 
sovereignty, based on popular consent, led to an essentialist - and essentialising - quest to 
categorize individuals as part of religious “communities,” whether majority or minority.56 Since 
the political balance of representation in Alexandretta and Mosul, and consequently the territorial 
fate of the two regions, was to be indexed to the size of each “community,” voter registration 
processes became politically pivotal. These processes forged political identities and 
constitutional facts in a frantic atmosphere of ultra-instrumentalised historical and sociological 
claim-making. Shields shows how even though individual LON missions to Mosul returned with 
changed assumptions about the possibility of even allocating “communal identity,” let alone 
basing political preferences on it, governments in Ankara, Damascus and Beirut all bought into 
the notion that the ethnic, religious or linguistic identity of the governed could be singularised 
and would necessarily determine the political preferences of individuals and groups. National 
governments then used that flawed premise to build irredentist diplomatic and publicity 
campaigns focused on the League. Shields then expands her argument into the UN era, 
examining the subsequent trajectory of consociationalism as a paradigm in post-1945 political 
science and explains the ways in which the UN staged the distillation and distribution of this 
paradigm of representation into the constitutional arrangements of newly independent and 
developing countries. She closes with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in 
2003, and the body blow dealt to the Iraqi nation state in the aftermath by the US imposition of a 
consociational set of political arrangements based on hazy assumptions about the meaning of 
religious community.  
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Konrad Lawson’s chapter takes up another context of global re-ordering against a backdrop of 
US military offensive, this time in East Asia at the time of the UN’s birth. Lawson recovers the 
surge of creative transnational idealism that characterized the 1940s by focusing on post-war 
Japanese calls for various forms of world federalism. These calls were prompted both by the 
experience of World War II and the atom bomb, but also by interwar ideas for regional and 
world organisation in Japan, which had reached a climax with the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere announced in 1940.
57
 Lawson delivers a close reading of the way two key 
figures in Japanese politics – Ozaki Yukio and Kagawa Toyohiko – responded to the context of 
defeat in 1945 and the potential of global internationalism in its aftermath. He shows for example 
how Kagawa Toyohiko, a Christian evangelist, cooperativist and social activist, despite his 
equivocal wartime support for the Japanese expansion into Asia, pivoted in 1945 to describe the 
San Francisco conference of that year as merely the first step in the creation of a genuine “world 
state” (sekai kokka).  By demonstrating how both thinkers drew on decades of intellectual and 
political experimentation in Japan to criticise the League and the UN as merely the first step to a 
more desirable world federation, Lawson documents how the two international institutions acted 
as a catalyst for post-imperial dynamics far from Geneva and New York City.  
Finally, in a chapter spanning the years 1919-1962, Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and José Pedro 
Monteiro cap the book by appraising the impact of the League and UN on another imperial 
formation, the Portuguese Empire in Africa, and specifically on the politics of forced labour. 
Forced labour was an elemental aspect of the politics of colonial social hierarchy in colonies 
such as Angola and Mozambique, and indispensable to the century-long series of projects to 
revivify Portuguese Empire through the creation of “new Brazils in Africa.” In a trio of case 
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studies – after World War I and World War II and finally in 1957-1962, closing with the 
abolition of the dual labour regime – the authors explore ways in which engagement with the 
League and the UN, and with transnational modes of publicity and NGOs, forced the Portuguese 
Empire to rethink and internally scrutinize its policies on forced labour even as it stumbled on as 
a political formation into the 1970s. 
 
Ultimately this book offers a multi-local and global perspective on internationalism, explicitly 
connecting the League and the UN while simultaneously outlining their differences, and 
emphasizing the influence on them of movements and powers that welled up around the world, 
far from Geneva and New York, yet in dialogue with those main stages. In doing so it reveals the 
inescapable complexity and diversity of internationalisms, from the visions of Charles Malik to 
the tireless activism of Nour Hamada, and from the Portuguese colonial administration wrestling 
with the Ghanaian government via the International Labor Organization to the efforts of Latin 
American states to bring their influence to bear on the international order. We hope that by 
outlining a more global approach to twentieth century internationalism – encompassing forces 
that sprang up in South and East Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Eastern 
Europe as well as the North Atlantic West – and by treating the League and UN as both 
individual entities and as an interconnected and conjoined whole, we will encourage further 
research along these lines. Such research will mingle international institutional perspectives with 
a serious engagement with local socio-cultural histories, national views and regional ideas about 
world order, based on archives and secondary historiographies in a wider variety of languages. It 
will certainly be a collaborative endeavour. Ceaselessly shaped by movements bubbling up from 
the outside, the League and the UN emerge in the essays that follow as networked platforms, 
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effective instruments and sometimes agents through which internationalism changed across the 
twentieth century. 
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